We study the verification of set operations in the model of authenticated data structures, namely the problem of cryptographically checking the correctness of outsourced set operations performed by an untrusted server over a dynamic collection of sets that are owned (and updated) by a trusted source. We present a new authenticated data structure scheme that allows any entity to publicly verify the correctness of primitive sets operations such as intersection, union, subset and set difference. Based on a novel extension of the security properties of bilinear-map accumulators as well as on a primitive called accumulation tree, our authenticated data structure is the first to achieve optimal verification and proof complexity (i.e., only proportional to the size of the query parameters and the answer), as well as optimal update complexity (i.e., constant), and without bearing any extra asymptotic space overhead. Queries (i.e., constructing the proof) are also efficient, adding a logarithmic overhead to the complexity needed to compute the actual answer. In contrast, existing schemes entail high communication and verification costs or high storage costs as they recompute the query over authentic data or precompute answers to all possible queries. Applications of interest include efficient verification of keyword search and database queries. We base the security of our constructions on the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Introduction
Providing integrity guarantees in third-party data management settings is an active area of research, especially in view of the growth in usage of cloud computing (e.g., Amazon web services). In such settings, verifying the correctness of outsourced computations performed over remotely stored data becomes a crucial property for the trustworthiness of cloud services. Such a verification process should incur minimal overheads to the clients or otherwise the benefits of computation outsourcing are dismissed; ideally, computations should be verified without having to locally rerun them or to utilize too much extra cloud storage.
In this paper, we study the verification of outsourced operations on general sets and consider the following problem. Assuming that a dynamic collection of m sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m is remotely stored at an untrusted server, we wish to publicly verify primitive queries on these sets, such as intersection, union and set difference. For example, for the query requesting the intersection of t sets specified by indices i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t between 1 and m, we wish to design techniques that allow any client to cryptographically check the correctness of the returned intersection S i 1 ∩S i 2 ∩. . .∩S it . In addition, we wish the verification of any set operation be operation-sensitive, meaning that the required complexity depends only on the (description and outcome of the) operation, and not on the sizes of the involved sets. For example, if |S i 1 ∩ S i 2 ∩ . . . ∩ S it | = δ then we would like the verification cost to be proportional to t + δ. This achieves optimality, as the query and the answer require O(t + δ) complexity. Applications of interest include computations related to keyword search and database queries, which boil down to set operations. Asymptotic access and group complexities of various schemes defined by algorithms {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify}, for a sets collection data structure of m sets: The sum of sizes of all the sets is M , 0 < < 1 is a constant, "Generic CR" stands for "Generic Collision Resistance" and upd is the update information, output by update(). We show complexities for an intersection query on t = O(1) sets, outputting an intersection δ elements. All sizes of the intersected and updated sets are Θ(n).
setup() update() & query() verify() & upd assumption refresh() proof Π(q) [13, 41] m + M log n + log m n + log m n + log m 1 Generic CR [29] m + M m + M n n n Strong RSA [32] m t + M m t 1 δ m t D. Log this m + M 1 n log 3 n + m log m δ 1 Bilinear q-Strong DH containment proofs to provide a novel optimal verification test for set disjointness. The intuition behind our technique is that disjoint sets can be represented by polynomials mutually indivisible, therefore there exist other polynomials so that the sum of their pairwise products equals to one-this is the test to be used in the proof. However, transmitting (and processing) these polynomials is bandwidth (and time)-prohibitive and does not lead to operation-sensitivity. Taking advantage of bilinearity properties, we can compress their coefficients in the exponent and still use them in a meaningful way, i.e., compute an internal product. This is why although using a conceptually simpler RSA accumulator [6] would lead to a mathematically sound solution, a bilinear-map accumulator [31] is essential for achieving the desired complexity goal. Authenticated data structure scheme. To formally describe our solutions and prove their properties we use an authenticated data structure scheme, which (informally) comprises a collection of algorithms {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} such that (a) genkey() produces the secret and public key of the system; (b) setup() initializes (i.e., computes) the authenticated data structure auth(D), on input a plain data structure D; (c) having access to the secret key, update() updates the authenticated data structure digest (e.g., the roothash of a Merkle tree), so that it could be used later for query verification; (d) without having access to the secret key, refresh() updates the authenticated data structure as a whole, so that it could be used later for query execution; (e) query() computes cryptographic proofs Π(q) for answers α(q) to data structure queries q; (f) verify() processes the proof Π(q) and the answer α(q) and either accepts or rejects the answer. Note that both query() and verify() are required to have no access to the secret key. The formal definition of all the algorithms above and the properties they should satisfy (correctness/security) are given in Definition 1. We note that both a three-party protocol [39] (see Corollary 1) and a two-party protocol [33] (see Corollary 2) can be realized via an authenticated data structure scheme. Complexity model. To explicitly measure complexity with respect to the number of primitive cryptographic operations, without considering the dependency on the security parameter, we adopt the complexity model used in memory checking [7, 14] . 2 The access complexity of an algorithm is defined as the number of memory accesses this algorithm performs on the authenticated data structure stored in an indexed memory of n cells, in order for the algorithm to complete its execution. We require that each memory cell can store up to O(poly(log n)) bits, a word size used in Blum's original memory checking work [7] but also in subsequent work [14] . For example, a Merkle tree [27] has O(log n) update access complexity since the update algorithm needs to read and write O(log n) memory cells of the authenticated data structure, each cell storing exactly one hash value. In our context, the group complexity of a data collection (e.g., proof group complexity) is defined as the number of elementary data objects (e.g., group elements or elements in Z p ) contained in that object. Whenever it is clear from the context, we omit the terms "access" and "group". Related work. The great majority of authenticated data structures involve the use of cryptographic hash-ing [3, 7, 19, 21, 25, 26, 30] or other primitives [18, 34, 35] to hierarchically compute over the outsourced data one or more secure digests. Most of these schemes incur verification costs that are proportional to the time spent to produce the query answer, thus not achieving operation sensitivity. Some bandwidth-optimal and operation-sensitive solutions for verification of various (e.g., range search) queries appear in [3, 20] . Despite the fact that privacy-related problems for set operations have been extensively studied in the cryptographic literature (e.g., [9, 15] ), existing work on the integrity dimension of set operations appears mostly in the database literature. In [13] , the importance of coming up with an operation-sensitive scheme is identified. In [29] , possibly the closest in context work to ours, set intersection, union and difference are authenticated with linear verification and proof costs. Same linear asymptotic bounds are achieved in [41] . In [32] , a different approach is taken: In order to achieve operation-sensitivity, expensive pre-processing and exponential space are required (i.e., answers to all possible queries are signed). Finally, related to our work are non-membership proofs, both for the RSA [23] and the bilinear-map [4, 12] accumulators. Contributions. Our main result (Theorem 1) is the first authenticated data structure that achieves optimal verification of the sets operations intersection, union, subset and set difference (as well as optimal updates).
This closes an open problem posed in [13] . Our scheme is proved secure under the bilinear extension of the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (see, e.g., [8] ). In the Appendix, we give applications (Section 11) of our construction to the authentication of keyword-search queries and database queries (e.g., equi-join), as long as some experimental results showing practicality (Section 12). A comparison of our work with existing schemes appears in Table 1 . The detailed proofs of our results appear in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
In the following, we denote with k the security parameter and with neg(k) a negligible function 3 . Bilinear pairings. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p, generated by g. Let also G be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p and e : G×G → G be a bilinear pairing with the following properties: (1) Bilinearity: e(P a , Q b ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z p ; (2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1; (3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G. We denote with (p, G, G, e, g) the bilinear pairings parameters, output by a PPT algorithm on input 1 k . The bilinear-map accumulator. Let (p, G, G, e, g) be a tuple of bilinear pairing parameters. The bilinearmap accumulator [31] is an efficient way to provide short proofs of (non-)membership for elements that (do not) belong to a set: It accumulates elements in Z * p and the accumulated value is an element in G. For a set of elements X in Z * p the accumulation value acc(X ) is defined as acc(X ) = g Q x∈X (x+s) , where s ∈ Z * p is a randomly chosen value that constitutes the trapdoor in the scheme. We note here that acc(X ) can be constructed by only using X and g, g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q (polynomial interpolation). The proof for subset containment of a set S ⊆ X -for |S| = 1, this is a proof of membership-is the witness (W S,X , S) where
A verifier can test subset containment for S by checking the relation e(W S,X , g
= e (acc(X ), g). Proving the security of the accumulator properties that we are using here requires the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, a slightly stronger assumption than the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [8] . 4 Assumption 1 (Bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption) Let k be the security parameter and let (p, G, G, e, g) be a uniformly randomly generated tuple of bilinear pairings parameters. Given the elements g, g s , . . . , g s q ∈ G for some s chosen at random from Z * p , where q = poly(k), there is no polynomial-time algorithm that can output the pair (a, e(g, g) 1/(s+a) ) ∈ Z * p × G except with negligible probability neg(k).
We continue with proving security of subset witnesses-the subset witnesses also appeared simultaneously (without a proof though) in [10] . We note that this proof is a generalization of the one in [31] :
Lemma 1 (Proving subsets) Let k be the security parameter and let (p, G, G, e, g) be a uniformly randomly generated tuple of bilinear pairings parameters. Given the elements g, g s , . . . , g s q ∈ G for some s chosen at random from Z * p and a set of elements X in Z p (q ≥ |X |), suppose there is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds S and W such that S X and e(W, g Q x∈S (x+s) ) = e(acc(X ), g). Then there is a polynomial-time algorithm for breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We now define an authenticated data structure scheme, by describing the following six algorithms: Definition 1 (Authenticated data structure scheme) Let D be any data structure supporting queries and updates. We denote with auth(D) the authenticated data structure and with d the digest of the authenticated data structure, i.e., a constant-size description of D. An authenticated data structure scheme A is a collection of the following six polynomial-time algorithms {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify}: (1) {sk, pk} ← genkey(1 k ): Outputs secret and public keys sk and pk, given the security parameter k;
Computes the authenticated data structure auth(D 0 ) and the respective digest of it, d 0 , given a plain data structure D 0 , the secret key sk and the public key pk; (3)
On input an update u on data structure D h , the authenticated data structure auth(D h ) and the digest d h , it outputs the updated data structure D h+1 along with auth(D h+1 ), the updated digest d h+1 and some relative information upd. It requires the secret key for execution;
On input an update u on data structure D h , the authenticated data structure auth(D h ), the digest d h and relative information upd output by update(), it outputs the updated data structure D h+1 along with auth(D h+1 ) and the updated digest d h+1 , without having the secret key as input; (5) {Π(q), α(q)} ← query(q, D h , auth(D h ), pk): On input a query q on data structure D h and auth(D h ) this algorithm returns the answer to the query α(q), along with a proof Π(q); (6) {accept, reject} ← verify(q, α(q), Π(q), d h , pk): On input a query q, an answer α(q), a proof Π(q), a digest d h and pk, it outputs either "accept" or "reject".
Let now {accept, reject} = check(q, α(q), D h ) be a method that decides whether α(q) is a correct answer for query q on data structure D h . There are two properties that an authenticated data structure scheme should satisfy, i.e., correctness and security (intuition follows from signature schemes definitions): Definition 2 (Correctness of authenticated data structure scheme) Let A be an authenticated data structure scheme {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify}. We say that the authenticated data structure scheme A is correct if, for all k ∈ N, for all {sk, pk} output by algorithm genkey(), for all D h , auth(D h ), d h output by one invocation of setup() followed by polynomially-many invocations of refresh(), where h ≥ 0, for all queries q and for all Π(q), α(q) output by query(q, D h , auth(D h ), pk), with all but negligible probability, whenever check(q, α(q), D h ) accepts, so does verify(q, Π(q), α(q), d h , pk).
Construction and algorithms
The data structure for which we design an authenticated data structure scheme for is called sets collection and is a generalization of the inverted index [5] . We describe it in detail in the following paragraph. Sets collection. The sets collection data structure consists of m sets, denoted with S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m , each containing elements from a universe U. Without loss of generality we assume that our universe U is the set of nonnegative integers in the interval [m + 1, p − 1], where p is k-bit prime, m is the number of the sets in our collection that has bit size O(log k) and k is the security parameter. 5 Every set S i does not contain duplicate elements, however an element x can appear in more than one set. Each set is sorted. The space usage of the sets collection is O(m + M ), where M is the sum of the sizes of the sets.
In order to get some intuition, we can view the sets collection as an inverted index. The elements are pointers to documents and each set S i corresponds to a term w i in the dictionary, containing the pointers to documents where term w i appears. In this example, m is the number of terms being indexed, which is typically in the hundreds of thousands, while M is the number of documents being indexed, which is in the billions. For the sake of generality, we refer to elements, instead of documents, and to sets, instead of terms.
The operations supported by the sets collection data structure consist of updates and queries. An update is either an insertion of an element into a set or a deletion of an element from a set. An update on a set of size n takes O(log n) time. For simplicity, we assume that the number m of sets does not change. A query is one of the following standard set operations: (1) Intersection:
Subset query: Given indices i and j, return true if S i ⊆ S j and false otherwise; (4) Set difference: Given indices i and j, return the set D = S i − S j . Finally, and for the remainder of the paper, we denote with δ the size of the answer to a query operation, i.e., δ is equal to the size of I, U, or D. For a subset query, δ is O(1).
In order to verify the integrity of the answers to set operation (under set updates), we are going to describe an authenticated data structure scheme ASC (see Definition 1) for the sets collection data structure. Our goal is to have no additional asymptotic overhead in the communication and verification complexity. I.e., for a query with t parameters and answer size δ, we want the proof and its verification to have optimal complexity O(t + δ). Also, we want algorithms query(), update() and refresh() to have low complexity. Algorithms of the scheme. We now describe the algorithms of an authenticated data structure scheme ASC (Definition 1) for a sets collection data structure and prove they satisfy the complexities of Table 1 . Algorithm {sk, pk} ← genkey(1 k ): Pick bilinear pairings parameters (p, G, G, e, g) and an element s ∈ Z * p at random. Subsequently, an one-to-one function h(·) : G → Z * p is used. This function just outputs the bit description of the elements of G. Finally the algorithm outputs sk = s and pk = {h(·), (p, G, G, e, g), {g s i : i = 1, . . . , q}}, where q ≥ max{m, max i=1,...,m {|S i |}}. The algorithm has O(1) access complexity.
Let D 0 be our initial data structure, i.e., the sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m . The authenticated data structure auth(D 0 ) is built as follows: First of all, for each set S i , the accumulation value of
(s+x) , is computed (see Section 2). 6 Subsequently, the algorithm picks a constant 0 < < 1. Let T be a tree structure that has l = 1/ levels and m leaves, numbered 1, 2, . . . , m, where m is the number of the sets of our sets collection data structure. Since this is a constant-height tree, the degree of any internal node of T is O(m ). We call such a tree an accumulation tree, which was originally introduced (combined with different cryptography) in [35] . For each node of the tree v, the algorithm recursively computes the digest d(v) of v as follows: If v is a leaf corresponding to set S i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the algorithm sets d(v) = acc(S i ) (s+i) (accumulating s + i in the exponent, under the constraint that i ≤ m, is used to prove that S i refers to acc(S i )). If node v is not a leaf, then 5 We could easily set our universe to be Z * p by using CRHFs, but we choose not to do so in sake of a cleaner presentation. 6 The polynomial Q x∈S i (s + x) is called characteristic polynomial of set Si in the literature (e.g., see [28] ).
where N (v) denotes the set of children of node v. The algorithm outputs all the sets S i as the data structure D 0 , all the accumulation values acc(S i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the tree T and all the digests d(v) for all v ∈ T as auth(D 0 ). Finally, the algorithm sets d 0 = d(r), 7 where r is the root of T (i.e., the digest of the authenticated data structure is defined as in a Merkle tree). The access complexity of the algorithm is O(m+M ) (postorder traversal of T and computation of acc(S i )), where M = m i=1 |S i | and the group complexity of auth(D 0 ) is also O(m + M ) since the algorithm stores one digest per node of T , T has O(m) nodes and there are also M elements contained in the stored sets, as part of auth(D 0 ).
Suppose the update is "insert element x ∈ U into set S i ". Let v 0 be the leaf node of T referring to set i. Let v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v l be the path in T ( ) from node v 0 to the root of the tree, where l = 1/ . The algorithm initially sets d (v 0 ) = acc(S i ) x+s , i.e., it updates the accumulation value that corresponds to the updated set. Note that in the case of deleting x from S i , the algorithm sets d (v 0 ) = acc(S i ) (x+s) −1 . Then the algorithm sets 
Suppose the update is "insert element x ∈ U into set S i ". Let v 0 be the node of T ( ) referring to set S i . Let v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v l be the path in T from node v 0 to the root of the tree. The algorithm, for j = 0, . . . , l, sets d(v j ) = d (v j ), i.e., it updates the digests that correspond to the updated path by using the information upd. Finally it outputs the updated sets collection as D h+1 , the updated digests d(v j ) (along with the ones that belong to the nodes that are not updated) as auth(D h+1 ) and d (v l ) (contained in upd) as d h+1 . 9 The algorithm has O(1) access complexity since it performs a number of operations proportional to 1/ .
Queries and verification
In this section, we show how compact proofs for the answers to set queries (e.g., intersection, union) can be constructed using the authenticated sets collection data structure presented earlier. The proofs have optimal size O(t + δ), where t is the size of the query parameters (e.g., t = 2 for an intersection of two sets) and δ is the answer size (e.g., δ = 1 if the intersection consists of one element). Our solutions use polynomial arithmetic. The following result is derived by using an FFT algorithm (e.g., see Preparata and Sarwate [37] note that there is no requirement for existence of an n-th root of unity in Z p for the algorithm to work) that computes the DFT in a finite field (e.g., Z p ) for arbitrary n and with O(n log n) field operations. Lemma 2 (Polynomial interpolation with FFT [37] ) Let
a i s i be a degree-n polynomial. The coefficients a n , a n−1 , . . . , a 0 can be computed with O(n log n) complexity, given x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n .
Lemma 2 describes how we can compute the coefficients a n , a n−1 , . . . , a 0 of a polynomial, given its roots. In the following, we give a result, related to certifying algorithms [22] , stating that if the vector coefficients a = [a n , a n−1 , . . . , a 0 ] is claimed to be correct, it can be certified, with high probability, with complexity less than O(n log n), i.e., without an FFT computation from scratch and given the vector of roots x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ]. This can be achieved with the following algorithm (not part of the ASC scheme):
, then the algorithm outputs accept, else it outputs reject. Lemma 3 (Verification of polynomial coefficients) Let a = [a n , a n−1 , . . . , a 0 ] and x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ]. Algorithm certify(a, x, pk) has O(n) complexity. Also, if accept ← certify(a, x, pk), then a n , a n−1 , . . . , a 0 are the coefficients of the polynomial n i=1 (s + x i ) with probability Ω(1 − neg(k)). Proof of accumulation values. Essential for our methods to work is the construction and the verification of proofs for the accumulation values acc(S i ), stored at leaf i of the tree T , for i = 1, . . . , m. Such proofs are a collection of O(1) accumulator witnesses: For accumulation value acc(S i ), the proof Π i is the ordered sequence π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π l , where π j is a tuple of a digest d(.) and a witness that authenticates every node of the path v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v l from the accumulation value acc(S i ) (we recall that v 0 stores the accumulation value acc(S i )) in question to the root v l of T . Thus, item π j is defined as
where
is the witness for a subset of one element (i.e., the element h(d(v j−1 ))), as defined in Section 2. For simplicity, we set
. Note that each π j has group complexity O(1) and can be constructed with O(m log m) complexity, using polynomial interpolation (due to the degree bound of an internal node of T and Lemma 2). Also, since proof Π i consists of O(1) such π j tuples, we conclude that the proof Π i for an accumulation value acc(S i ) can be constructed with O(m log m) complexity and has O(1) group complexity. In the following we formally give the algorithms queryTree() and verifyTree() for the construction and the verification of such proofs respectively. Similar methods have been described in [35] .
. . , v l be the path of T from the node storing acc(S i ) to the root of T . The algorithm sets
is given in Relation 5, computed by Lemma 2. The algorithm sets α i = acc(S i ) as an answer.
. . , π l ) be the proof, where π j = (β j , γ j ). The algorithm outputs "reject" if one of the following is true (note that the verification algorithm is using the bilinear map function e(., .)):
Lemma 4 Algorithm queryTree() has O(m log m) access complexity, outputting a proof of O(1) group complexity. Moreover algorithm verifyTree() has O(1) access complexity. We now give the security property that holds for this construction. Lemma 5 is going to be used as a building block of the proof of security (Theorem 1) of the whole scheme (see proof in the Appendix):
In the following we describe the algorithms for an intersection and a union query in detail. The details of the the subset and the set difference query are in the Appendix (Section 9). The parameters of an intersection or a union query are t indices, namely the indices i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t , with 1 ≤ t ≤ m. To simplify the notation, we assume without loss of generality that these indices are 1, 2, . . . , t. We denote with n i the size of set S i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t) and we define N = t i=1 n i . I.e., N is the total size of the sets involved in the intersection or the union and δ is the size of the intersection or union. Note, that in all cases δ = O(N ) and that performing the actual operations has O(N ) complexity, by using a generalized merge.
Intersection query. Let I = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ . . . ∩ S t = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }. We express the correctness of the answer I to the intersection query by means of the following two conditions:
Note the completeness condition in Equation 7 is necessary since I should contain all the common elements. Given an intersection I, and for every set S j , we define polynomial P j (s) = x∈S j −I (x + s), of degree n j . We can now state the following lemma: (see proof in the Appendix): Lemma 6 Set I is the intersection of sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t if and only if there exist polynomials q 1 (s), q 2 (s),
We can now use Lemmata 2 and 6 to construct efficient proofs for both conditions in Equations 6 and 7: Proof of subset condition. For each set S j , 1 ≤ j ≤ t, the subset witnesses
are computed, as defined in Section 2: Witness W I,j will serve as a proof that I is a subset of set S j . By using Lemma 2, computing each such witness has complexity O(n j log n j ). Thus, the total complexity for computing all the t subset witnesses is O(N log N ), where N = t i=1 n i . 10 Proof of completeness condition. Suppose q 1 (s), q 2 (s), . . . , q t (s) are polynomials computed in Lemma 6 that satisfy q 1 (s)P 1 (s) + q 2 (s)P 2 (s) + . . . + q t (s)P t (s) = 1. For j = 1, . . . , t, the completeness witnesses F I,j = g q j (s) are computed. By Lemma 6, computing the completeness witnesses has O(N log 2 N log log N ) complexity. We can now formally define algorithms query() and verify() of the authenticated data structure scheme ASC and for the intersection query:
The query q is the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , t}, requiring the intersection of S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t . Let α(q) = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ } be the intersection I. The proof Π(q) consists of the following parts: (1) Coefficients b δ , b δ−1 , . . . , b 0 of polynomial (s+y 1 )(s+y 2 ) . . . (s+y δ ) associated with the intersection I = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }, computed with O(δ log δ) complexity (Lemma 2), and of total group complexity O(δ); (2) Accumulation values acc(S j ) associated with the sets S j , along with their respective proofs Π j , output by calling algorithm queryTree(j, D h , auth(D h ), pk), for j = 1, . . . , t, the computation of which has O(tm log m) complexity (Lemma 4). Moreover the group complexity of all Π j is O(t) (Lemma 4); (3) Subset witnesses W I,j (see above) for j = 1, . . . , t, the computation of which has O(N log N ) complexity (Lemma 2). Also the subset witnesses have total group complexity O(t); (4) Completeness witnesses F I,j = g q j (s) (see above) for j = 1, . . . , t, the computation of which has O(N log 2 N log log N ) complexity (Lemma 6). The completeness witnesses have group complexity O(t).
The verification algorithm performs the following steps:
and the answer α(q) = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }, and calls certify(b, α(q), pk) in order to certify the validity of b δ , b δ−1 , . . . , b 0 . This step, by Lemma 3, has O(δ) complexity. If certify() rejects, the algorithm outputs reject; 11 (2) Subsequently, the algorithm uses the proofs Π j to verify the integrity of acc(S j ), for j = 1, . . . , t, by using algorithm verifyTree(j, acc(S j ), Π j , d h , pk). This step has O(t) complexity (Lemma 4). If the verification fails for at least one of acc(S j ), it outputs reject; (3) Next, the subset condition is checked: 12
10 This is because P nj log nj ≤ log N P nj = N log N . 11 Algorithm certify() is used to achieve optimal verification and avoid an O(δ log δ) FFT computation from scratch. 12 Computing the quantity
has O(δ) complexity, and is done once.
This step has O(t + δ) complexity. If any of the above checks fails, the algorithm outputs reject; (4) Finally, the completeness condition is checked:
If this relation holds, the algorithm accepts α(q) as the correct intersection. This step has O(t) complexity. We note that for Relation 9, it indeed holds t j=1 e (W I,j , F I,j ) = e(g, g)
) when all the subset witnesses W I,j , all the completeness witnesses F I,j and all the sets accumulation values acc(S j ) have been computed honestly, since q 1 (s)P 1 (s) + q 2 (s)P 2 (s) + . . . + q t (s)P t (s) = 1. This is a required step for proving that the authenticated data structure is correct, as defined in Definition 2 (proof in the Appendix). We continue with describing the remaining queries such as union, subset and set difference. Union query. The answer to a union query is the set U = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ . . . ∪ S t = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }. We express the correctness of the answer U to the union query by means of the following two conditions:
Note that the superset condition is needed to make sure that no element has been excluded from the returned answer U. We now formally describe algorithms query() and verify() for the union query.
The query q is the union of the sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t . Let α(q) = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ } be the union U. The proof Π(q) consists of the following parts:
associated with the union I = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }; (2) Accumulation values acc(S j ) associated with the sets S j , along with their respective proofs Π j , output by calling algorithm queryTree(j, D h , auth(D h ), pk), for j = 1, . . . , t; (3) For each y i , i = 1, . . . , δ, a membership witness W y i ,S k is provided (see Relation 1). This proves that y i belongs to some set S k for some k = 1, . . . , t. These δ witnesses have O(δ) group complexity and constructing them has O(N log N ) complexity (Lemma 2); (4) Finally, for each j = 1, . . . , t a subset witness W S j ,U is provided-as defined in Relation 1. This proves that U is a superset of S j . These witnesses have group complexity O(t). Constructing them has O(N log N ) complexity (Lemma 2).
and the answer α(q) = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }, and calls certify(b, α(q), pk) in order to certify the validity of b δ , b δ−1 , . . . , b 0 ; (2) Subsequently, the algorithm uses the proofs Π j to verify the integrity of acc(S j ), for j = 1, . . . , t, by using algorithm verifyTree(j, acc(S j ), Π j , d h , pk). If the verification fails for at least one of acc(S j ), it outputs reject; (3) Then the algorithm verifies that each element y i (i = 1, . . . , δ) of the reported union belongs to some set S k , for some k = 1, . . . , t (O(δ) complexity). This is done by checking that the following relation holds e(W y i ,S k , g y i g s ) = e(acc(S k ), g) for all i = 1, . . . , δ (else output reject); (4) Finally, the algorithm verifies that all sets of the query are subsets of the union, by checking the following conditions:
If any of the above checks fails, reject is output. Else {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ } is accepted as the correct union. Subset and set difference query. For a subset query (positive or negative), we use the property S i ⊆ S j ⇔ ∀y ∈ S i : y ∈ S j . For a set difference query we use the property
The details of the algorithms concerning these queries can be found in Section 9 in the Appendix. We now give the final theorem of our work. Its proof is in the Appendix, including detailed proof of security.
Theorem 1 Consider a collection of m sets S 1 , . . . , S m and let M = m i=1 |S i | and 0 < < 1. For a query operation involving t sets, let N be the sum of the sizes of the involved sets, and δ be the answer size. There exists an authenticated data structure scheme ASC = {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} for a sets collection data structure D with the following properties: (1) it is correct and secure according to Definitions 2 and 3 and based on the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption; (2) The access complexity of algorithm (1); (3) For all queries q (intersection/union/subset/difference), algorithm query() has O(N log 2 N log log N +tm log m) access complexity, algorithm verify() has O(t + δ) access complexity and the proof Π(q) has O(t + δ) group complexity; (4) The group complexity of the authenticated data structure auth(D) is O(m + M ).
Security, protocols and applications
In this section we give a proof sketch for the security (based on Definition 3) of one query, i.e., that of the intersection and comment on how our authenticated data structure scheme can be used by a three-party protocol [39] and a two-party protocol [33] . We also talk about some applications. Security proof sketch. Let D 0 be a sets collection data structure consisting of m sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m and let ASC = {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} be our authenticated data structure scheme. Let k be the security parameter and let {sk, pk} ← genkey(1 k ). The adversary is given the public key pk, namely the values {h(.), (p, G, G, e, g), g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q } and unlimited access to all the algorithms of ASC, except for setup() and update() to which he only has oracle access. The adversary initially outputs the authenticated data structure auth(D 0 ) and the digest d 0 , through an oracle call to algorithm setup(). Then the adversary picks a polynomial number of updates u i (e.g., insert an element x into a set S r ) and outputs the data structure D i , the authenticated data structure auth(D i ) and the digest d i through oracle access to update(). Then he picks a set of indices q = {1, 2, . . . , t} (wlog), all between 1 and m and outputs a proof Π(q) and an answer I = I = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ . . . ∩ S t which is rejected by check() (incorrect). Suppose the answer α(q) contains d elements. The proof Π(q) contains (i) Some coefficients β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β d ; (ii) Some accumulation values acc j with some respective proofs Π j , for j = 1, . . . , t; (iii) Some subset witnesses W j with some body witnesses F j , for j = 1, . . . , t (this is what algorithm verify() expects for input). Suppose verify() accepts. Then: (a) By Lemma 3, β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β d are indeed the coefficients of the polynomial x∈I (x + s), except with negligible probability; (b) By Lemma 5, values acc j are indeed the accumulation values of sets S j , except with negligible probability; (c) By Lemma 1, values W j are indeed the subset witnesses for set I (with reference to S j ), i.e., W j = g P j (s) , except with negligible probability; (d) However, P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s) are not coprime since I is incorrect and therefore I cannot contain all the elements. By the verification of Relation 9 (completeness condition), we can derive a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs a bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman challenge (a, e(g, g) 1/(s+a) ) for an element a that is a common factor of the polynomials P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s). The full proof is in the Appendix. Protocols. As we mentioned in the introduction, an authenticated data structure scheme A may be used by a three-party protocol [39] : A trusted entity, called source, owns a data structure D h , but desires to outsource query answering, in a trustworthy (verifiable) way. The source runs genkey() and setup(), outputs the authenticated data structure auth(D h ) along with the digest d h . The source subsequently signs the digest d h , and it outsources auth(D h ), D h , the digest d h and its signature (which is forwarded to the clients during verification) to some untrusted entities, called servers. On input a data structure query q sent by the clients, the servers use auth(D h ) and D h to compute proofs Π(q), by running algorithm query(). Clients can verify these proofs Π(q) by running algorithm verify(), and since they have access to the signature of d h . When there is an update in the data structure-issued by the source-, the source uses algorithm update() to produce the new digest d h to be used for the next verification, while the servers update the authenticated data structure through refresh(). The corollary below summarizes the three-party protocol:
Corollary 1 (Three-party protocol) Let k be the security parameter, S 1 , . . . , S m be a sets collection data structure D, M = m i=1 |S i |, 0 < < 1 and ASC be a correct and secure authenticated data structure scheme for D. For a query operation involving t sets, let N be the sum of the sizes of the involved sets and δ be the answer size. There exists a three-party authenticated data structures protocol involving a trusted source, an untrusted server and a client for verifying queries on D such that: (a) The setup at the source has O(m + M ) access complexity; (b) The update at the source has O(1) access complexity; (c) The space needed at the source and the server has O(m + M ) group complexity; (d) The communication between the source and the server has O(1) group complexity; (e) The update at the server has O(1) access complexity; (f) For all queries q (intersection/union/subset/set difference), the query at the server has O(N log 2 N log log N + tm log m) access complexity, the verification at the client has O(t + δ) access complexity and the proof Π(q) has O(t + δ) group complexity; (g) For a query q sent by the client to the server at any time (even after updates), let α be an answer and let π be a proof returned by the server. With probability Ω(1 − neg(k)), the client accepts the answer α if and only if α is correct.
We note here that an authenticated data structure scheme A can also be used by a non-interactive twoparty authenticated data structures protocol [33] : In this case, the source and the client coincide (i.e., the source issues both the updates and the queries) and the source is required to keep only constant state, i.e., the digest. A non-interactive two-party protocol that uses an authenticated data structure scheme for a data structure D is directly comparable with the recently appeared model of outsourced verifiable computation [2, 11, 17] for the functionalities offered by the data structure D, e.g., computation of intersection, union, etc.: Corollary 2 (Two-party protocol) Let k be the security parameter, S 1 , . . . , S m be a sets collection data structure D, M = m i=1 |S i |, 0 < < 1 and ASC be a correct and secure authenticated data structure scheme for D. For a query operation involving t sets, let N be the sum of the sizes of the involved sets and δ be the answer size. There exists a non-interactive two-party authenticated data structures protocol involving a trusted source and an untrusted server for verifying queries on D such that: (a) The setup at the source has O(m + M ) access complexity; (b) The update at the source has O(1) access complexity; (c) The space needed at the source has O(1) group complexity while the space needed at the server has O(m + M ) group complexity; (d) The update at the server has O(m log m) access complexity; (e) For all queries q (intersection/union/subset/set difference), the query at the server has O(N log 2 N log log N + tm log m) access complexity, the verification at the client has O(t + δ) access complexity and the proof Π(q) has O(t + δ) group complexity; (f) For a query q sent by the source to the server at any time (even after updates), let α be an answer and let π be a proof returned by the server. With probability Ω(1 − neg(k)), the source accepts the answer α if and only if α is correct. Applications. First of all, our scheme can be used to verify keyword-search queries implemented by the inverted index data structure [5] : Each term in the dictionary corresponds to a set in our sets collection data structure which contains all the documents that include this term. A usual text query for terms m 1 and m 2 returns those documents that are included in both the sets that are represented by m 1 and m 2 , i.e., their intersection. Moreover, the derived authenticated inverted index can be efficiently updated as well. However, sometimes in keyword searches (e.g., keyword searches in the email inbox) it is desirable to introduce a "second" dimension: For example, a query could be "give me the emails that contain terms m 1 and m 2 and which were received between time t 1 and t 2 ", where t 1 < t 2 . We call this procedure timestamped keyword-search. One solution for that could be to embed a timestamp in the documents (e.g., each email message) and have the client do the filtering locally, after he has verified-using our schemethe intersection of the sets that correspond to terms m 1 and m 2 . However, this is not operation-sensitive at all: The intersection can be a lot bigger than the set resulted after the application of the local filtering, making this straightforward solution inefficient. By using a segment-tree data structure [38] , we show in the Appendix how this problem is solved efficiently (see Theorem 2) . Finally, in Theorem 3 in the Appendix we show how to use our method for the verification of equi-join queries over relational tables. Experimental results in the Appendix (Section 12) indicate that our schemes compare favorably with existing work. Conclusions and open problems. In this paper, we presented an authenticated data structure for the optimal verification of set operations. The achieved efficiency is mainly due to new, extended security properties of accumulators based on pairing-based cryptography. Our solution provides two important properties, namely public verifiability and efficiency, as opposed to the outsourced verifiable computation model. A natural question to ask is whether outsourced verifiable computation with secrecy, public verifiability and efficiency exists. Analogously, which other specific functionalities can be optimally and publicly verified? Finally, according to a recently proposed definition of optimality [36] , our construction is nearly optimal-only verification costs (hence the title) and updates are optimal. It is interesting to explore whether an optimal authenticated sets collection data structure is possible, i.e., one that asymptotically matches the bounds of the plain sets collection data structure, reducing the query time from O(N log 2 N ) to O(N ).
Appendix 5 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes such a set S = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y }. Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } and y j / ∈ X for some 1 ≤ j ≤ . That means that e(W, g) Q y∈S (y+s) = e(g, g) (x 1 +s)(x 2 +s)...(xn+s) .
Note that (y j + s) does not divide (x 1 + s)(x 2 + s) . . . (x n + s). Therefore there exist polynomial Q(s) of degree n − 1 and constant λ, such that (x 1 + s)(x 2 + s) . . . (x n + s) = Q(s)(y j + s) + λ. Thus we have e(W, g)
This means that the algorithm can be used to break the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellmann assumption.
Proof of Lemma 3
The complexity of algorithm certify() has access complexity O(n) since it involves O(n) multiplications, additions and exponentiations. The probability that certify() accepts while a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n are not the coefficients of the polynomial that has roots −x 1 , −x 2 , . . . , −x n is equal to the probability of κ being the root of the polynomial
This follows from polynomial equality that should hold for all κ. Now, polynomial R(κ) has degree n = poly(k) and has O(n) roots. Since κ is picked at random from Z * p , it follows that this probability is bounded by O(poly(k)/2 k ), which is neg(k), and therefore the validity of the coefficients can be verified with probability Ω(1 − neg(k)) with Θ(n) complexity.
Proof of Lemma 5
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ m and let v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v l be a path in the tree. The adversary Adv outputs an incorrect answer
(x+s) = acc(S i ) and also a proof Π i = (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π l ) (l = 1 ) where π j = (β j , γ j ) (see algorithm queryTree()). We define now the following events, related to the choice of the proof above made by the adversary. Our goal will be to the express the probability that verifyTree(i, α i , Π i , d h , pk) accepts and α i = acc(S i ) as a function of the following events. Note that d h is the correct digest of the authenticated data structure:
1. E 0,0 : The value α i picked by Adv is such that α i = acc(S i ).
2. E 1 : The value β 1 picked by Adv is such that e(β 1 , g) = e(α i , g s g i ). This event can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events, i.e., E 1 = E 1,0 ∪ E 1,1 such that • E 1,0 : Value β 1 is not a correctly formed digest of node v 0 , as defined in Relation 3;
• E 1,1 : Value β 1 is a correctly formed digest of node v 0 , as defined in Relation 3, i.e., it is
for some set S and where 1 ≤ ≤ m. 3. E j : For j = 2, . . . , , the values β j , β j−1 and γ j−1 picked by Adv are such that
This event can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events, i.e., E j = E j,0 ∪ E j,1 such that • E j,0 : Value β j is not a correctly formed digest of node v j−1 , as defined in Relation 3;
• E j,1 : Value β j is the is a correctly formed digest of node v j−1 , as defined in Relation 3. 4. E ,1 : The values β l and γ l picked by Adv are such that
The probability that verifyTree() accepts, while α i = acc(S i ) is the probability
First we examine the event E 0,0 |E 1,1 . The event E 1,1 implies that the adversary has found a value α i such that e g
By Lemma 1, with probability Ω(1 − neg(k)), it has to be i ∈ { } ∪ S j . However, since 1 ≤ ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ m and for all x ∈ S it is x > m, we conclude that that i = . Therefore α i = acc(S i ), with probability
For the remaining events E j−1,0 |E j,1 (j ≥ 2), note that by the one-to-one property of the function h(.), E j−1,0 is equivalent with the event "value h(β j−1 ) is not the h(.) value of the digest of node v j−2 , as defined in Relation 3". However, by the definition of the digest β j (the digest of the father of v j−2 is the accumulation value of the h(.) values of the digests of all of it children, see Relation 3), the event E j−1,0 |E j,1 implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (Assumption 1), by Lemma 1. Therefore for all j = 1, . . . , l, Pr[E j−1,0 |E j,1 ] is neg(k). Since l = O(1), the total probability is also neg(k). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6
(⇒) This direction follows by the fact that we can use the extended Euclidean algorithm and find polynomials q 1 (s), . . . , q t (s) such that q 1 (s)P 1 (s) + . . . + q t (s)P t (s) = GCD(P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s)).
Since P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s) share no common factors , it follows that GCD(P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s)) = 1.
(⇐) Suppose there exist polynomials q 1 (s), q 2 (s), . . . , q t (s) that satisfy relation q 1 (s)P 1 (s) + q 2 (s)P 2 (s) + . . . + q t (s)P t (s) = 1 but I is not the intersection. This means that polynomials P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s) share at least one common factor, e.g., (s + r). Therefore there exists some polynomial A(s) such that (s + r)A(s) = 1, i.e., the polynomials (s + r)A(s) and 1 are equal, which is a contradiction (note that we want the polynomials to be equal for every s ∈ Z p ).
In order to compute these coefficients, we use the extended Euclidean algorithm recursively, based on the fact that the greatest common divisor GCD(P 1 (s), . . . , P t (s)) equals GCD(P 1 (s), GCD(P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s))). To compute the greatest common divisor of two O(n)-degree polynomials, we can use the algorithm described in [16] that has O(n log 2 n log log n) complexity. Since we are using this algorithm t times, the time complexity is O(tn log 2 n log log n). Moreover, by the property that x log x + y log y ≤ (x + y) log(x + y) and since the size of the sets participating in the intersection is N this equals O(N log 2 N log log N ). This algorithm also outputs the required coefficients. If we arrange our data (i.e., t polynomials) on a binary tree, after all the coefficients of the internal nodes have been computed, the final coefficients for all elements at the leaves can be computed in O(t) multiplications (we can avoid the O(t log t) cost) of O(n i ) degree polynomials, where n i are the degrees of the polynomials of the leaves. Therefore the result holds.
Subset and set difference query
Subset. Here we use the property S i ⊆ S j ⇔ ∀y ∈ S i : y ∈ S j .
Algorithm {Π(q), α(q)} ← query(q, D h , auth(D h ), pk): (subset) The proof contains the following elements: (1) Accumulation values acc(S i ) and acc(S j ) associated with the sets S i and S j , along with their respective proofs Π i and Π j , output by queryTree(i, D h , auth(D h ), pk) and queryTree(j, D h , auth(D h ), pk) (O(m m) complexity by Lemma 4); (2) For a positive answer (i.e., S i ⊆ S j ), the proof contains a subset witness of S i with respect to S j , i.e., the value W S i ,S j as defined in Relation 1 (O(N log N ) complexity by Lemma 2). For a negative answer (S i S j ), the algorithm picks a y ∈ S i such that y / ∈ S j , returns a membership proof of y in S i , i.e., the witness W y,S i as defined in Relation 1. Also it returns a proof for an empty intersection of the sets {y} and S j , i.e., the completeness witnesses F y = g qy(s) and F j = g q j (s) such that (y + s)q y (s) + P j (s)q j (s) = 1 13 (only the proof for the completeness condition is needed, i.e., Relation 9). The total complexity is O(N log 2 N log log N + m log m) (Lemmata 4 and 6) and the group complexity of the proof is O(1).
Algorithm {accept, reject} ← verify(q, α(q), Π(q), d h , pk): (subset) The verification for query "is S i ⊆ S j ?" is as follows: (1) Verify the integrity of acc(S i ) and acc(S j ) by using verifyTree(i, acc(S i ), Π i , d h , pk) and verifyTree(j, acc(S j ), Π j , d h , pk) with O(1) complexity, by Lemma 4 (else output reject); (2) For a positive answer, output reject if e(W S i ,S j , acc(S i )) = e(acc(S j ), g). Otherwise output reject if either (a) e(W y,S i , g y g s ) = e(acc(S i ), g) or (b) e(g y g s , F y )e(acc(S j ), F j ) = e(g, g). Else output accept. The whole test has O(1) complexity. This step, by Lemma 3, has O(δ) complexity. If certify() rejects, the algorithm outputs reject; (2) The algorithm verifies the integrity of acc(S i ) and acc(S j ) by using the algorithm verifyTree(i, acc(S i ), Π i , d h , pk) and the algorithm verifyTree(j, acc(S j ), Π j , d h , pk) with O(1) complexity, by Lemma 4 (else output reject); (3) The algorithm outputs reject if either (a) e(W D,S i , acc(D)) = e(acc(S i ), g); or (b) The completeness proof (W I,i , W I,j , F I,i , F I,j ) for the intersection I = S i ∩ S j does not verify (note we are not using the explicit intersection elements in this verification, but W D,S i . Summing up, the algorithm has O(δ) complexity.
Set difference query. Let
10 Proof of Theorem 1
Correctness
Let D 0 be any sets collection data structure containing m sets. Fix the security parameter k and output pk = {h(.), (p, G, G, e, g), g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q } and sk = s by calling algorithm genkey(). Then output an authenticated data structure auth(D 0 ) and the respective digest d 0 , by calling algorithm setup(). Pick a polynomial number of updates-namely, pick a polynomial number of elements for insertion (or deletion) into (or from) a set S r -and update auth(D 0 ) and d 0 by calling algorithm refresh(). Let D h be the final sets collection data structure, auth(D h ) be the produced authenticated data structure and d h be the final digest. By the way refresh() works (see Relation 4), at every time, the digest d(v) of a node v of the tree T is maintaining the following property: If v i is a leaf corresponding to number 1 ≤ i ≤ m (i.e., to set S i ), it always is d(v i ) = acc(S i ) (s+i) . Otherwise, for every other node v of T , it always is
where N (v) denotes the set of children of node v. We prove correctness for all four query operations, i.e., for intersection, union, subset and difference.
Intersection. Let our query q be {1, 2, . . . , t} (wlog), i.e., a set of indices that refer to the intersection of sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t . Algorithm query() outputs the proof Π(q) and the correct answer I = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , (x+s) associated with the sets S j , using their respective proofs Π j , output by queryTree(j, D h , auth(D h ), pk), for j = 1, . . . , t. We recall that each Π j is the ordered sequence π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π l (l = 1/ ), where π i is the tuple (d(v i−1 ), W v i−1 (v i ) ), where
is the witness for a subset of one element (i.e., the element h(d(v i−1 ))), as defined in Section 2. By Relation 3, verifyTree(j, acc(S j ), Π j , d h , pk), on such inputs, always accepts; 3. The subset witnesses W I,j = g P j (s) = g Q x∈S j −I (x+s) for j = 1, . . . , t. It is e(W I,j , acc(I)) = e(acc(S j ), g), by the properties of the bilinear map, therefore Algorithm verify() does not reject in this item either; 4. The completeness witnesses F I,j = g q j (s) for j = 1, . . . , t. It is t j=1 e (W I,j , F I,j ) = e(g, g)
since by the construction of the completeness witnesses it should be t j=1 q j (s)P j (s) = 1. This completes the proof of correctness for the case of intersection, since we proved that for every intersection query q and for every correct answer and proof output by query(), verify() always accepts.
Union. Let our query q be {1, 2, . . . , t} (wlog), i.e., a set of indices that refer to the union of sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t . Algorithm query() outputs the proof Π(q) and the correct answer U = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ } = S 1 ∪S 2 ∪. . .∪S t . The proof Π(q) for a union contains the following parts: 2. The membership witnesses W y i ,S k for some k = 1, . . . , t, for each element y i (i = 1, . . . , δ). For i = 1, . . . , δ, it is e(W y i ,S k , g y i g s ) = e(acc(S k ), g), since W y i ,S k is the subset witness as defined in Relation 1; 3. The subset witnesses W S j ,U , for all j = 1, . . . , t. For all j = 1, . . . , t it is e(W S j ,U , acc(S j )) = e(acc(U), g) , where W S j ,U is the subset witness of S j with respect to U, as defined in Relation 1 and U ⊇ S j for all j = 1, . . . , t; This completes the proof of correctness for the case of union, since we proved that for every union query q and for every correct answer and proof output by query(), verify() always accepts.
Subset. Let our query be "is S i ⊆ S j ?. Algorithm query() outputs the proof Π(q) and the correct answer, i.e., either true or false. The proof Π(q) for a subset query contains the following parts:
1. The accumulation values acc(S i ) and acc(S j ). These are always verified as in the case of intersection. See Item 2 above; 2. Depending on whether we have a positive or a negative answer, we distinguish the following cases:
• Positive answer, i.e., S i is a subset of S j . The proof contains the subset witness W S i ,S j . Then it is e(W S i ,S j , acc(S i )) = e(acc(S j ), g), by the definition of W S i ,S j (see Relation 1) and since S i ⊆ S j ; • Negative answer, i.e., S i is not a subset of S j . The proof contains an element y such that y ∈ S i but y / ∈ S j , the respective membership witness W y,S i and two completeness witnesses F y and F j . It is e(W y,S i , g y g s ) = e(acc(S i ), g), by definition of W y,S i in Relation 1 and since y ∈ S i . Also it holds e(g y g s , F y )e(acc(S j ), F j ) = e(g, g), since F y = g qy(s) and F j = g q j (s) are such that (y + s)q y (s) + q j (s) x∈S j (x + s) = 1 and y / ∈ S j . This completes the proof of correctness for the case of the subset query, since we proved that for every subset query q and for every correct answer and proof output by query(), verify() always accepts.
Set difference. Let our query q be the indices i and j that refer to the difference of sets S i and S j . Algorithm query() outputs the proof Π(q) and the correct answer D = S i − S j = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }. The proof Π(q) for a difference query contains the following parts:
1. The coefficients b δ , b δ−1 , . . . , b 0 (that relate to the difference {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y δ }) and the accumulation values acc(S i ) and acc(S j ). These are always verified as in the case of intersection. See Items 1 and 2 above; 2. The completeness witnesses F D and F j ), for proving an empty intersection of D and S j . It is e(acc(D), F D )e(acc(S j ), F j ) = e(g, g), by the same argument as in Item 2 in the subset query; 3. The proof for the intersection I = S i ∩ S j . We are using the proof as in the intersection case; 4. The value L = g
This completes the proof of correctness for all the queries supported by sets collection, since we proved that for every query q (intersection/union/subset/difference) and for every correct answer and proof output by query(), verify() always accepts.
Security
Let Adv be a computationally-bounded adversary, D 0 be a sets collection data structure consisting of m sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m , ASC = {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} be our authenticated data structure scheme, k be the security parameter and {sk, pk} ← genkey(1 k ). The adversary Adv is given the public key pk, nameley the values {h (.), (p, G, G, e, g), g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q } and unlimited access to all the algorithms of ASC, except for setup() and update() to which he only has oracle access. The adversary initially outputs the authenticated data structure auth(D 0 ) and the digest d 0 , through an oracle call to algorithm setup(). Then the adversary picks a polynomial number of updates (e.g., insert an element x into a set S r ) and eventually outputs the data structure D h , the authenticated data structure auth(D h ) and the digest d h through oracle access to update(). Note that since d h , the digest of the authenticated data structure, is produced through oracle access to setup() and update(), it follows that it is the correct one. We now prove the security of each operation separately. Intersection. Let the intersection query be a set of indices {1, 2, . . . , t} (wlog). The adversary Adv outputs an incorrect answer I = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e δ } = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ . . . ∩ S t and also a proof that consists of the following elements:
1. Coefficients γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 ; 2. Accumulation values acc 1 , acc 2 , . . . , acc t , along with proofs π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π t ; 3. Subset witnesses W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W t ; 4. Completeness witnesses F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F t . We define now the following events, related to the choice of the proof above made by the adversary. Our goal will be to the express the probability of the security definition (Definition 3) in Relation 2 as a function of the following events.
• E 1 : The values γ = [γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 ] and the answer e = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e δ } picked by Adv are such that accept ← certify(γ, e, pk). Event E 1 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 1,0 and
The coefficients γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 are not the coefficients of the polynomial (s + e 1 )(s + e 2 ) . . . (s + e δ ); -E 1,1 : The coefficients γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 are the coefficients of the polynomial (s + e 1 )(s + e 2 ) . . . (s + e δ ).
• E 2 : The values acc 1 , acc 2 , . . . , acc t and π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π t picked by Adv are such that they are accepted by algorithm verifyTree(), i.e., it is accept ← verifyTree(j, acc j , π j , d h , pk), for all j = 1, . . . , t. Event E 2 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 2,0 and E 2,1 , i.e, E 2 = E 2,0 ∪ E 2,1 : -E 2,0 : There exists j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} such that acc j = acc(S j ); -E 2,1 : For all j = 1, . . . , t it is acc j = acc(S j ). • E 3 : The values γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 , W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W t and acc 1 , acc 2 , . . . , acc t picked by Adv satisfy
Event E 3 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 3,0 and E 3,1 , i.e, E 3 = E 3,0 ∪ E 3,1 :
-E 3,0 : There exists j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} such that the opposites of the roots of the polynomial δ i=0 γ i s i are not a subset of S j ; -E 3,1 : The opposites of the roots of the polynomial δ i=0 γ i s i are a subset of S j for all j = 1, . . . , t.
• E 4 : The values W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W t and F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F t picked by Adv satisfy t j=1 e (W j , F j ) = e(g, g); • F: The answer (intersection) I picked by Adv is not correct, i.e., I = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e δ } = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ . . . ∩ S t . Let now P be the probability of Definition 3 (Relation 2), i.e., it is
We recall that the authenticated data structure scheme ASC is secure if P ≤ ν(k), where ν(k) is neg(k). We observe that for the case of the intersection query, P can be expressed as the probability of the intersection of the events E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , F. By using simple probability calculus, this can be written as
We compute each such probability separately:
For this event we note that the event E 3,0 is conditioned on the event E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 . This condition allows us to replace acc j with acc(S j ) (due to E 2,1 ) and δ i=0 γ i s i with x∈I (x + s) (due to E 1,1 ) in the event E 3,0 . Therefore the event E 3,0 |E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 is the event e g Q x∈I (x+s) , W j = e (acc(S j ), g) ∧ I S j for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} .
This event implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (Assumption 1), by Lemma 1. Therefore the probability Pr[
For this event we note that the event E 4 is conditioned on the event E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 ∩ F. This condition allows us to replace acc j with acc(S j ) (due to E 2,1 ) and δ i=0 γ i s i with x∈I (x + s) (due to E 1,1 ) in the event E 3,1 . Therefore, the event
This is equivalent to writing W j as the subset witness W I,S j , i.e.,
Note now that E 4 is also conditioned on F. Therefore I is has to be incorrect. Specifically, since I ⊆ S j for all j = 1, . . . , t, it follows that I does not contain all the elements of the intersection, i.e., it is incomplete. Thus the polynomials P 1 (s), P 2 (s), . . . , P t (s) (Relation 12) have at least one common factor, say (s + r) and it holds P j (s) = (s + r)Q j (s) for some polynomials Q j (s)-computable in polynomial time-, for all j = 1, . . . , t. Therefore the event
.
Therefore we can derive an 1/(s + r)-th of e(g, g) as e(g, g)
This implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption for the setting (p, G, G, e, g) (Assumption 1). By Assumption 1, this probability is neg(k), and therefore Pr[E 4 |E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 ∩ F] is neg(k). Thus the total probability P is neg(k). This concludes the proof for the security of an intersection query.
Union. Let the union query be a set of indices {1, 2, . . . , t} (wlog). The adversary Adv outputs an incorrect answer U = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e δ } = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ . . . ∪ S t and also a proof that consists of the following elements: 1. Coefficients γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 ; 2. Accumulation values acc 1 , acc 2 , . . . , acc t , along with proofs π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π t ; 3. For each element e i ∈ U, membership witnesses W i,j with reference to some set S j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ t; 4. Subset witnesses W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W t that prove that U is a subset of S j , for all j = 1, 2 . . . , t. We define now the following events, related to the choice of the proof above made by the adversary. Our goal will be to the express the probability of the security definition (Definition 3) in Relation 2 as a function of the following events.
• , g ) for all i = 1, . . . , δ and j i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} .
Event E 3 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 3,0 and E 3,1 , i.e, E 3 = E 3,0 ∪ E 3,1 : -E 3,0 : There exists i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , δ} such that e i / ∈ S j i ; -E 3,1 : For all i = 1, 2, . . . , δ it is e i ∈ S j i .
• E 4 : The values W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W t , acc 1 , acc 2 , . . . , acc t and γ δ , γ δ−1 , . . . , γ 0 picked by Adv satisfy
• F: The answer (union) U picked by Adv is not correct, i.e., U = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e δ } = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ . . . ∪ S t . Similarly with the intersection security proof, let P be the probability of Definition 3 (Relation 2). We observe that for the case of the union query, P can be expressed as the probability of the intersection of the events E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , F. By using simple probability calculus (and similarly with the intersection security proof), this can be written as
For this event we note that the event E 3,0 is conditioned on the event E 2,1 . This condition allows us to replace acc j with acc(S j ) in the event E 3,0 . Therefore the event E 3,0 |E 2,1 is the event
For this event we note that the event E 4 is conditioned on the event E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 ∩ F. This condition allows us to replace acc j with acc(S j ) (due to E 2,1 ) and δ i=0 γ i s i with x∈U (x + s) (due to E 1,1 ) in the event E 4 . Therefore, the event E 4 |E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ E 1,1 is the event e (W j , acc(S j )) = e g Q x∈U (x+s) , g .
Note now that E 4 is also conditioned on E 3,1 . Thus it holds that all elements e i ∈ U belong to some S j i . Therefore the reported union cannot contain extra elements. Also, E 4 is conditioned on F (incorrect union). Therefore the reported union must contain less elements and there should be an S j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) that contains an r such that r / ∈ U. Therefore since Relation 13 holds, we can find P (s), Q(s) and α such that e (W j , acc(S j )) = e(W j , g) (s+r)P (s) = e g Q x∈U (x+s) , g = e(g, g) (s+r)Q(s)+α .
This implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption for the setting (p, G, G, e, g) (Assumption 1). By Assumption 1, this probability is neg(k), and therefore Pr[E 4 |E 3,1 ∩E 2,1 ∩E 1,1 ∩F] is neg(k). Thus the total probability P is neg(k). This concludes the proof for the security of a union query.
Subset. Let the subset query be "is S i ⊆ S j ?". For a positive answer, the adversary Adv outputs an incorrect answer "false" and also a proof that consists of the following elements: 1. Accumulation values acc i and acc j along with proofs π i and π j ; 2. A membership witness W i,j with reference to set S j . We define now the following events, related to the choice of the proof above made by the adversary. Our goal will be to the express the probability of the security definition (Definition 3) in Relation 2 as a function of the following events.
• E 2 : The values acc i , acc j , π i and π j picked by Adv are such that they are accepted by algorithm verifyTree(), i.e., accept ← verifyTree(i, acc i , π i , d h , pk) and accept ← verifyTree(j, acc j , π j , d h , pk). Event E 2 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 2,0 and E 2,1 , i.e, E 2 = E 2,0 ∪ E 2,1 : -E 2,0 : acc i = acc(S j ) or acc j = acc(S i ); -E 2,1 : acc i = acc(S i ) and acc j = acc(S j ).
• E 3 : The values acc i , acc j and W i,j picked by Adv satisfy e (W i,j , acc i ) = e (acc j , g).
• F: S i S j . Similarly with the intersection security proof, let P be the probability of Definition 3 (Relation 2). We observe that for the case of the positive subset query, P can be expressed as the probability of the intersection of the events E 2 , E 3 , F. By using simple probability calculus (and similarly with the intersection security proof), this can be written as
For this event we note that the event E 3 is conditioned on the event E 2,1 ∩ F. This condition allows us to replace acc i with acc(S i ) and acc j with acc(S j ) in the event E 3 . Therefore the event E 3 |E 2,1 ∩ F is the event
This event implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (Assumption 1), by Lemma 1. Therefore the probability Pr[E 3 |E 2,1 ∩ F] is neg(k); This concludes the security proof for the case of the positive subset query. For a negative answer, the adversary Adv outputs an incorrect answer "true" and also a proof that consists of the following elements: 1. Accumulation values acc i and acc j along with proofs π i and π j ; 2. An element y; 3. A membership witness W y for element y; 4. Completeness witnesses F y and F j for element y. We define now the following events, related to the choice of the proof above made by the adversary. Our goal will be to the express the probability of the security definition (Definition 3) in Relation 2 as a function of the following events.
• E 2 : Same as in the positive answer;
• E 3 : The values acc i , W y and y picked by Adv are such that e(W y , g s g y ) = e(acc i , g). Event E 3 can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive events E 3,0 and E 3,1 , i.e,
The values y, F y , acc j and F j picked by Adv are such that e(g y g s , F y )e(acc j , F j ) = e(g, g);
Similarly with the intersection security proof, let P be the probability of Definition 3 (Relation 2). We observe that for the case of the negative subset query, P can be expressed as the probability of the intersection of the events E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , F. By using simple probability calculus (and similarly with the intersection security proof), this can be written as
For this event we note that the event E 3,0 is conditioned on the event E 2,1 . This condition allows us to replace acc i with acc(S i ) in the event E 3,0 . Therefore the event E 3,0 |E 2,1 is the event
Since we have the condition on E 3,1 ∩ F (y ∈ S i and S i ⊆ S j ), it must be that y ∈ S j . Therefore there exists a polynomial Q(s) such that
This implies breaking the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption for the setting (p, G, G, e, g) (Assumption 1). By Assumption 1, this probability is neg(k), and therefore Pr [E 4 |E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ F] is neg(k). Thus the total probability P is neg(k). This concludes the proof for the security of a negative subset query.
We have already proved (intersection proof) that the probability that the above event holds and S i − D = S i ∩ S j is neg(k). However, the event S i − D = S i ∩ S j is equivalent with the event D = S i − S j , which is our event F. Therefore the probability Pr[E 4 |E 3,1 ∩ E 2,1 ∩ F] is neg(k). This completes the proof of security for all the queries of the sets collection data structure.
Complexity. The complexity proofs are given in the description of the algorithms.
Applications
Timestamped keyword-search. As we saw, in timestamped keyword-search, the embedded timestamp technique cannot work since the intersection can be a lot bigger than the set resulted after the application of the local filtering, making this straightforward solution inefficient. We now describe an algorithmic construction to solve this problem. Let t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t r be the discrete timestamps that we are interested in (t i can be viewed as a certain day of the month). We define a new sets collection data structure as follows: Imagine t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t r are the leaves of a binary tree. We build a segment tree [38] on top of these timestamps as follows: Each leaf storing timestamp t i contains the documents (e.g., email messages) that were received at time t i . Moreover, the internal nodes of the binary tree contain the documents that correspond to the union (note that this union does not have any common elements) of the documents contained in the children's nodes, recursively defining in this way sets of documents for all the nodes of the tree. Therefore we end up with a new sets collection data structure that is built on top of these 2r − 1 sets (one set per internal tree node of the tree), namely the sets T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2r−1 . The timestamped keyword-search is therefore verified by two sets collection data structures, one built on the text terms, namely the sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m , and one built on top of the sets of the timestamps, namely the sets T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2r−1 . Define now the extension of two timestamps ext(t 1 , t 2 ) to be the set of sets T i that "cover" the interval [t 1 , t 2 ], i.e., namely the set that contains sets the union of which equals the set of all timestamps in [t 1 , t 2 ]. One can easily see that for every 1 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ r, it is |ext(t 1 , t 2 )| = O(log r).
Suppose now we want to verify the documents that contain terms m 1 and m 2 and which were received between t 1 and t 2 . All we have to do is to verify the intersection of the following sets: (a) the union of sets in ext(t 1 , t 2 ), (b) S 1 (set that refers to term m 1 ) and, (c) S 2 (set that refers to term m 2 ). Let T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T be the disjoint sets that are contained in ext(t 1 , t 2 ), where = O(log r). The answer to the query is the set
Since T i are disjoint, each term of the union contributes at least one new term to the answer, and therefore we can verify this query in a nearly operation-sensitive way by authenticating log r intersections separately (note there is an extra O(log r) multiplicative factor in the complexities of Theorem 2). Therefore: Theorem 2 Consider a collection of m sets S 1 , . . . , S m and let M = m i=1 |S i | and 0 < < 1. For a query operation involving in a time interval [t 1 , t 2 ], let t be the number of involved sets, N be the sum of the sizes of the involved sets, and δ be the answer size. There exists an authenticated data structure scheme T KS = {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} for a timestamped keyword-search data structure D with the following properties: (1) it is correct and secure according to Definitions 2 and 3 and based on the bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption; (2) The access complexity of algorithm (1); (3) For a time-stamped keyword-search query, algorithm query() has O(N log r log 2 N log log N +t(m+r) log(m+r)) access complexity, algorithm verify() has O(t log r+δ) access complexity and the proof Π(q) has O(t log r + δ) group complexity; (4) The group complexity of the authenticated data structure auth(D) is O(m + r + M ).
Note that in the above theorem we do not have a result concerning the verification of union with timestamps. This is due to the following: Using the same notation as we did for the intersection, the answer to the union query, would be the set (
The nature of the answer does not allow for any further algebraic processing and therefore in order to authenticate the whole expression, one needs to verify the two unions separately. This leads to a solution that is not operation-sensitive, therefore the operation-sensitive verification of this type of queries cannot be achieved with our method-at least in a way similar to the techniques we have used so far. The same applies for the difference queries. Equi-join queries. Finally, we show how our technique can be used in efficient verification of database queries, such as equi-join. Let R 1 (α, r 11 , . . . , r 1w ) , . . . , R m (α, r m1 , . . . , r mw ) be m relational tables, that have up to n tuples each, and which share a common attribute α. We now want to compute the equi-join query on the common attribute α on any subset of t of them. This is basically an intersection that can be authenticated by building our scheme on top of the attributes α, for all relations R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m .
To handle duplicate values for the attribute α, we build our authentication scheme on top of distinct α values for all the relations R i , i = 1, . . . , m and we keep a separate structure that maps α to all the related records, for all relations R i , i = 1, . . . , m. This authenticated structure can be a bilinear-map accumulated value that adds (i.e., the respective witness) only constant overhead per relation (1024 bits in practice) to the proof size, for each element that appears in the equi-join answer. We note that the verification of these type of queries have also been studied in [41] . Therefore we have the following theorem: Theorem 3 Consider a collection of m relational tables R i for i = 1, . . . , m and let M = m i=1 |R i |.
For an equi-join query, let t be the number of involved relational tables, N be the sum of the sizes of the involved relational tables, and δ be the answer size. There exists an authenticated data structure scheme EQJ = {genkey, setup, update, refresh, query, verify} for a data structure answering equi-join queries D with the following properties: (1) 
Analysis
In this section we analyze the costs needed by our solution and compare with experimental results from other works. For bilinear maps and generic-group operations in the bilinear-map accumulator, we used the PBC library [1] , a library for pairing-based cryptography, interfaced with C.
System setup
We choose our system parameters as follows. First of all, type A pairings are used, as described in [24] . These pairings are constructed on the curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the base field F q , where q is a prime number. The multiplicative cyclic group G we are using is a subgroup of points in E(F q ), namely a subset of those points of F q that belong to the elliptic curve E. Therefore this pairing is symmetric. The order of E(F q ) is q + 1 and the order of the group G is some prime factor p of q + 1. The group of the output of the bilinear map G is a subgroup of F q 2 .
In order to instantiate type A pairings in the PBC library, we have to choose the size of the primes q and p. The main constraint in choosing the bit-sizes of q and p is that we want to make sure that discrete logarithm is difficult in G (that has order p) and in F q 2 . Typical values are 160 bits for p and 512 bits for q. We use the typical value for the size of q, i.e., 512 bits. Note that with this choice of parameters the size of the elements in G (which have the form (x, y), i.e., points on the elliptic curve) is 1024 bits. Finally, let's assume that the accumulation tree that is built on top of the set digests, has two levels, i.e., = 0.5.
Communication cost
Here we analyze the communication cost that our scheme has for an intersection of two sets. Let's assume that the size of the reported intersection is δ. Then as we saw in Section 3, the proof (apart from the answer itself), consists of the following values: (a) Two subset witnesses, two completeness witnesses, two accumulation values (each one of the accumulation values comes with two proof elements of two group elements each that serve as a proof for it). Therefore the size of all these elements, which are all elements of group G, is not dependent on the size of the intersection and is equal to 2 × (1024 + 1024 + 1024 + 4 × 1024)/8 = 1792 bytes; (b) The coefficients b i ∈ Z p (we recall p is 160 bits long) of the intersection, for i = 1, . . . , δ. These have size 160δ/8 = 20δ bytes. Therefore the total communication cost is a linear function of δ, i.e., the function 1792 + 20δ (in bytes).
We now compare the communication cost of our scheme with the analysis made in [29] . In Table 2 we compare with the results presented in Table IV of [29] where various set sizes n 1 and n 2 are used and the size of the intersection δ is always 0.01n 2 . Note that in most cases, our communication cost is a lot less than the one reported in [29] . More importantly, it is not dependent on the size of the sets participating in the intersection. In cases that our cost is worse, it is due to the big constants enforced by the use of bilinear pairings and accumulators. Finally, we compare our solution, in terms of communication cost, with the cost required for authenticating equi-joins with the most efficient algorithm presented in [41] , i.e., algorithm AIM (see Table 3 ). In Figure 17 of [41] two relations R and S are equi-joined and the size of the verification object (VO) is displayed, for multiple tuple sizes (a tuple is a row in the relations) tup = 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 bytes. For this experiment, the size of the answer is 31 × 10 3 tuples and therefore if we use our scheme the cost is 1792 + 20δ + δtup + 2δ × 128 bytes, for δ = 31 × 10 3 (the cost 2δ × 128 is due to dealing with duplicate values-see description of equi-join verification before Theorem 3). Note that, especially for large tuple sizes, there are considerable savings with our scheme.
Verification cost
Let exp, mult, add be the times needed to perform an exponentiation, a multiplication and an addition respectively, all modulo p. Let also EXP, MULT be times required for exponentiation and mulatiplication in group G and let EX P, MULT be the respective times in the target group of the bilinear map G. Finally let MAP be the time needed to perform the operation e(., .). We benchmarked all these operations using the PBC library [1] (version pbc − 0.5.7), on a 64-bit, 2.8GHz Intel based, dual-core, dual-processor machine with 4GB main memory, running Debian Linux, and derived the following times, i.e., MAP = 5ms, MULT = 0.005ms, exp = 0.02ms, add = 0.002ms and mult = 0.002ms.
We analyze now the verification cost of a 2-intersection, required by our scheme. Let S i and S j be the sets of the intersection. The verification algorithm, on input the proof has to perform the following tasks: (a) First it verifies acc(S i ) and acc(S j ), which requires two bilinear-map computations for each value, therefore taking time 4MAP. (b) Then the experiment of Lemma 3 is executed. The time needed for this part is δ(2mult + 2add + exp); (c) Then the algorithm checks the subset condition which takes time 4MAP; (d) Finally it checks the completeness condition that takes times 2MAP + MULT . Therefore we see that the total cost for verification of a 2-intersection of size δ is 10MAP + δ(2mult + 2add + exp) + MULT , which is a linear function in δ, namely the function 50 + 0.028δ (in ms).
